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A satisfactory solution to the mind-problem should answer the two fol-
lowing questions: i) are phenomenal properties, the properties that charac-
terize states of consciousness, physical? ii) how do phenomenal properties
causally interact with physical properties? To a first approximation, physi-
calism and dualism are the two possible answers to the first question. There
are three kinds of views regarding causal interactions between phenomenal
and physical properties: nomism (they interact through deterministic laws),
acausalism (they do not causally interact), and anomalism (they interact, but
not through deterministic laws). In this paper, I explore anomalous dualism,
a combination of views that has not previously been explored. I suggest
that a kind of anomalous dualism, nonreductive anomalous panpsychism,
∗For some time, this paper was circulated under the title “Anomalous Panpsychism”.
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promises to offer the best overall answer to two pressing issues for dualism:
the problem of mental causation and the mapping problem (the problem of
predicting mind-body associations). I will start by charting the logical space
around anomalous dualism.
1 The logical space
We can define physical properties as properties that satisfy one of the fol-
lowing conditions: i) properties of roughly the kind that have so far been
uncovered by biology, chemistry, and physics; ii) the properties that can be
constituted by physical properties; iii) the properties that actually consti-
tute physical properties (if any). By X constitutes Y, I mean that X realizes
Y, grounds Y, or stands in a determinate-determinable relationship to Y.
This definition of physical properties corresponds roughly to what Chalmers
(2015) calls “broadly physical properties”.
I take physicalism to be the view that everything, including phenome-
nal properties, is physical. Anti-physicalism is the negation of physicalism,
whereas dualism is the view that phenomenal properties are instantiated but
none is physical. Anti-physicalism without dualism is quite implausible, so
the mind-body problem is typically conceived of as requiring us to choose
between physicalism and dualism. Note that, since we understand “physi-
cal” broadly, Russellian monism and functionalism both count as kinds of
physicalism.
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Issues pertaining to mental causation figure centrally in the debate be-
tween physicalists and dualists. For present purposes, we can think of causa-
tion as a relation between events, and we can think of events as instantiations
of properties by individuals at times. There are three possible views that one
might take on any given alleged instance of causation between mental and
physical events: nomism is the view that the instance of causation is sub-
sumed under a deterministic law of nature; anomalism is the view that it
is an instance of non-deterministic causation; acausalism is the view that
denies that there is any genuine causation. One can be a nomist (or an
anomalist or an acausalist) about some alleged interactions and not others,
but, plausibly, mind-to-matter interactions are either all nomic or all anoma-
lous, and matter-to-mind interactions are either all nomic or all anomalous.
I will refer to nomism about all mental-physical causation in both directions
as generalized nomism, and likewise for the other views.
Physicalism and dualism can both be combined with each of nomism,
anomalism, or acausalism about any given subset of alleged causal relations.
If we consider only generalized versions of the views on causation and set aside
acausalism as implausible, we have four options shown in Table 1. Only one
Table 1: Four possible positions on the mind-body problem
Generalized nomism Generalized anomalism
Physicalism Standard physicalism Anomalous monism
Dualism Standard interactionism Anomalous dualism
of these views has not been seriously considered: anomalous dualism. The
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aim of this paper is to explore the viability of this view as an approach to
the mind-body problem. More specifically, I am interested in finding out
whether this view is promising for a dualist view.
For someone who is persuaded that physicalism is true, this might seem
like a futile exercise, but I think there is something in this paper even for
convinced physicalists. Physicalism is largely motivated in opposition to
dualism: dualism has too many problems (especially pertaining to mental
causation), so physicalism must be true despite appearances (no one can deny
that phenomenal properties really don’t seem to be physical). If anomalous
dualism turns out to avoid dualism’s well-known difficulties, the motivation
for physicalism will be weakened.
In the next two sections, I consider the two main problems that dualism
faces: the problem of mental causation and the mapping problem. The latter
has not been widely discussed, but it seems to me that it underlies much of
the skepticism about dualism. I will suggest that anomalous dualism is the
most promising dualist view as far as mental causation and the mapping
problem are concerned. This is not to say that anomalous dualism does not
have other problems. In section 4, I will consider various potential issues with
anomalous dualism. I will suggest that a version of anomalous dualism that




Dualism has troubles with mental causation. The problem is that the physical
world appears to be closed to causal influence from non-physical factors,
in the sense that nothing non-physical can be causally relevant to physical
events. If this is true, then either dualism is false or mental events are
not causally relevant to physical events. Assuming that mental events are
causally relevant to physical events, dualism must be false.
In order to see possible ways out of this argument, we need to get a
little clearer on the justification for the claim that nothing non-physical can
influence physical events. This does not seem to be something that is revealed
by physics or any other science.1 To a first approximation, what physics
seems to tell us is that every physical event is a deterministic effect of another
physical event. This is what is generally referred to as the completeness of
physics. For reasons that will become apparent shortly, I prefer to refer to
this thesis as physical determinism.
Physical determinism Every physical event is an immediate deterministic
effect of a physical event.
By immediate, I mean that the effect is not mediated by another event.
It is not entirely obvious how to use physical determinism to argue against
dualism, but there is at least one widely accepted way. Suppose first that
1Papineau (2001) makes this point and offers an excellent overview of the history of
the closure problem for dualism. The first argument discussed below is adapted from
Papineau’s discussion.
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mental events have physical effects.
Mental efficacy Some phenomenal events have physical effects.
To complete the argument, we need to assume that the effects of mental
events on physical events are not all overdetermined.
No systematic overdetermination The immediate effects of phenomenal
events on physical events are not all overdetermined.
An event is overdetermined when there are two wholly distinct events of
which it is an immediate effect. By wholly distinct, I mean events that are
non-identical and not related through a relation of constitution (as defined
above).2
Given mental efficacy and the no systematic overdetermination principle,
we can infer that some phenomenal event M has an immediate physical effect
P that is not overdetermined. P’s not being overdetermined means that there
is not a second event wholly distinct from M that also has P as immediate
effect. But physical determinism requires that P is the immediate effect of
a physical cause C. So M must not be wholly distinct from C. Given our
definition of “physical”, this means that M is a physical event. Since we are
assuming that events are instantiations of properties, it follows that some
mental properties are physical properties. Therefore, dualism is false.
Since the no systematic overdetermination principle is not a priori, one
might question it. The rationale behind it is that it is hard to see what
2The “wholly distinct” qualification makes no-overdetermination consistent with nonre-
ductive physicalism and Russellian monism.
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plausible setup might guarantee the overdetermination of the effects of mental
events on physical events. Overdetermination can happen, as in firing squad
situations, but no one has made it plausible that the effects of mental events
on physical events are systematically overdetermined. Without some kind of
independent justification, the hypothesis of systematic overdetermination is
ad hoc and implausible.
One widely overlooked reason why denying the no systematic overdeter-
mination principle is unattractive is that this premise is actually dispensable.
It is dispensable on the assumption that mental efficacy entails counterfactual
dependence.
Counterfactual dependence Some actual physical event is counterfactu-
ally dependent on an actual mental event.
An event A is counterfactually dependent on an event B if and only if it is the
case that A would not have occurred if B had not occurred. Even if mental ef-
ficacy didn’t entail counterfactual dependence, counterfactual dependence is
just as plausible as mental efficacy, so we can replace mental efficacy by coun-
terfactual dependence in our argument. This yields the following argument
against dualism. Take any physical event P that is counterfactually depen-
dent on a phenomenal event M as required by counterfactual dependence.
Physical determinism implies that P had an immediate sufficient physical
cause C1, which itself had an immediate sufficient physical cause C2, and
so on ad infinitum (or up to a first physical event if we make an exception
to physical determinism for a first physical event). Take the event C along
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this chain that occurred at exactly the same time as M (we can slice the
events of the chain in whatever way is necessary to delineate such an event).
If dualism is true, C is wholly distinct from M. It follows from the stan-
dard, non-backtracking way of assessing counterfactuals that C would have
occurred even if M had not occurred.3 Since C is by hypothesis sufficient for
a chain of events leading to P, this means that P would have occurred even if
M had not occurred. This contradicts our assumption that P is counterfactu-
ally dependent on M. Therefore, one of physical determinism, counterfactual
dependence, or dualism must be false.
Denying counterfactual dependence is an option for the dualist, but it
comes with a huge cost: if counterfactual dependence is false, there is a
clear sense in which the mental makes no difference to the physical. But if
mental states made no difference to the physical, we wouldn’t expect brains
created through natural selection to involve any consciousness, much less
for the phenomenal properties associated with physical properties to exhibit
any sort of cohesion or “make sense”. This seems to be a fatal objection to
mind-to-matter acausalism however the relevant causal roles are understood
3In assessing counterfactuals of the form “had A been the case, B would have been the
case”, we must check whether B is the case at the nearest possible worlds at which A is the
case. Importantly, the nearest worlds need not be worlds that are physically possible: we
don’t look for worlds that have histories that explain A through laws like ours (this would
typically require us to “backtrack” into the history of the world). Rather, we allow A to
be the case at a world just like ours, without a suitable history, as if by miracle (Lewis
1973, 1979). As a result, any contemporaneous or earlier fact at the actual world that is
metaphysically compatible with A is also a fact at the nearest A worlds. In our case C is
contemporaneous with M and metaphysically independent of it (in virtue of dualism), so
the nearest M-less world is a C world.
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exactly.4
This leaves a dualist with one possible response to the arguments from
mental causation, which is to deny physical determinism. Unlike the other
responses we have considered so far, this response has some initial plausibil-
ity. After all, physical determinism has been shown to be false by quantum
mechanics. More specifically, quantum measurements are indeterministic in
two ways: first, the outcomes of quantum measurements are probabilistic,
following probability distributions fixed by quantum states; second, when
a measurement occurs, and what the measured observable is, are not de-
termined by anything within standard quantum theory.5 These facts are
typically ignored by philosophers of mind because the evidence from neuro-
science seems to suggest that mental activity is implemented in macroscopic
neural patterns.6 But our understanding of the brain remains fairly limited,
and it is not hard to imagine how sub-neuronal conditions for consciousness
might have gone unnoticed. So, let us not prejudge this empirical question.
4One might also argue from everyday experience that phenomenal states have bodily
effects. For example, conscious intentions seem to cause bodily movements. Some con-
siderations in section 4 below throw some doubt on this, but they leave untouched the
argument that consciousness must do something for our brains to have evolved to produce
cohesive streams of experience.
5There are developments of the theory that attempt to give a physical explanation of
measurement, but none is widely accepted.
6Sometimes, allowances are made for quantum randomness by formulating complete-
ness as follows: the objective probability of every physical event is determined by a prior
physical event (Yablo 1992; Bennett 2007). This is still too strong because that a mea-
surement will occur at any given time in a quantum system is not physically determined
on standard interpretations. Events that could occur as a result of measurement don’t
have any objective probability until a measurement is “decided”. If measurement is not
decided by a physical state (which is not the case on standard QM), not every physical
event has a probability fixed by a prior physical event.
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If we limit ourselves to assuming a limited completeness of physics that is
consistent with quantum mechanics, the following is the principle that we
should use as premise as part of arguments from mental causation against
dualism:
Completeness For every non-random physical event Y, some immediately
prior physical event X is causally sufficient for Y.
A random event is an event whose occurrence was not determined by deter-
ministic laws of nature, for example, the immediate outcome of a quantum
measurement. I formulate the exception to determinism built into complete-
ness in terms of randomness, and not specifically in term of quantum mea-
surement, because I want to stay as close as possible to observation. We
don’t know whether a future, more complete physics might not drop “mea-
surement” talk entirely in favor of a deeper characterization of what is going
on. What we do know is that nature occasionally exhibits fundamentally
indeterministic behavior that is correctly modeled by the mathematics of
quantum mechanics.
Our qualified, scientifically correct completeness claim renders invalid the
arguments sketched above. However, the dualist is not out of trouble yet,
because the arguments can be fixed. To make our arguments valid again, we
can add a further premise that specifies that the effects of mental events do
not fall under the exception we have carved out for random physical events:
No-randomness The immediately physical effects of mental events are not
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random events.
This might seem like a somewhat ad hoc claim, but it falls out of a slightly
stronger claim that seems to be a natural, widely held view:
Mind-to-matter nomism The effects of mental events on physical events
fall under deterministic laws.
Given mental efficacy and no-randomness, we can infer that mental events
have immediate, non-random physical effects. By the completeness principle,
each of these effects has an immediate physical cause. Assuming that there
is no systematic overdetermination, some of the physical causes of the effects
of mental events are not wholly distinct from the mental events. This leads
to the conclusion that dualism is false.
The argument from counterfactual dependence is slightly more compli-
cated with completeness than with physical determinism. It requires us to
consider not just any counterfactual dependence relationship between mental
and physical events, but a direct counterfactual relationship, one that is not
the result of intermediary counterfactual dependence relationships. We can
infer the existence of such relationships from counterfactual dependence: if
there is a counterfactual dependence relationship between M and P, there
must be a direct counterfactual dependence relationship between some men-
tal event N and some physical event O, because the mental and the physical
have to interface somewhere along the chain of dependent events. Now sup-
pose that C is the physical event at the origin of the chain of physical events
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leading to O, which we know exists by completeness and no-randomness. Ei-
ther C occurred after N, or it did not. We can plausibly argue that C cannot
have occurred after N because this would mean that it occurred in the time
between N and O, but there cannot be any such time: if there was, we could
discern intermediary events and counterfactual dependence relationships be-
tween N and O. If C did not occur after N, the argument proceeds as before:
we can find a link in the chain C...O that is contemporaneous with N and
argue from dualism that it would have occurred even if N had not occurred,
which means that O (and P) would have occurred even if N (and M) had not
occurred.
The versions of the argument from mental causation that appeal to com-
pleteness don’t leave the dualist many options. Completeness is too well
established scientifically to be questioned on the basis of a posteriori arm-
chair considerations, and denying mental efficacy altogether seems absurd.
As a result, denying mind-to-matter nomism seems to be the only poten-
tially acceptable option. The thesis that mind-to-matter nomism is false
has received some attention in the context of Davidson’s (1970) defense of
anomalous monism, and there seems to be fairly widespread agreement that
Davidson at least makes a good case for doubting the existence of strict laws
connecting mental and physical events.7 Many authors have raised doubts
regarding the viability of anomalous monism as an account of mental cau-
sation, but anomalism remains fairly plausible independently of the rest of
7Seager (1981) offers a rigorous defense of anomalism that refines Davidson’s arguments.
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Davidson’s view. In any case, it is far more plausible than denying complete-
ness or denying mental causation altogether.
The dualist should not merely deny mind-to-matter nomism; she should
also endorse mind-to-matter anomalism. First, this is required to escape the
argument from counterfactual dependence, which only needs one instance
of deterministic mind-to-matter causation. Second, if she took the position
that some but not all effects of mental events on physical events are non-
random, she would run the risk that some of the non-random events are also
not overdetermined, which would allow her opponent to use our argument
from no systematic overdetermination. Overdetermination plausibly can only
occur by accident, so an “almost no overdetermination” principle is about
as plausible as our no systematic overdetermination principle. As a result,
the dualist has to at least endorse the view that deterministic causation
from mental to physical events is rare. She might as well take the simpler,
more principled view that it is the nature of such causation to involve some
randomness (mind-to-matter anomalism).
Endorsing mind-to-matter anomalism seems to be the best strategy for
the dualist, but one might worry that this response is merely an empty shell
of a theory, and that it is not plausible unless there is some reasonable way
of filling in the details, of explaining how the supposed random interface
between the mental and the physical works.
A number of theorists have argued for a relationship between quantum
randomness and consciousness. However, I am not aware of a “quantum the-
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ory of consciousness” that succeeds at giving a reasonably plausible account
of mental causation that is consistent with completeness, mind-to-matter
anomalism, and the totality of empirical evidence regarding the dynamics
of physical systems. Some theories allow mental states to deterministically
cause physical states, claiming that such causation occurs under the cover of
quantum randomness (cf. Eccles 1978), which is why we have not noticed it.
This kind of view is ruled out by our arguments from completeness, as well
as by empirical evidence (Bourget 2004). Other theories are consistent with
completeness but not the totality of evidence regarding the dynamics of phys-
ical systems. According to Stapp’s (1996) view, for example, the conscious
mind acts on the body by selecting when a quantum measurement is per-
formed and what observable is measured. Because of a phenomenon known
as the “Zeno effect”, this theoretically allows the conscious mind to control
what the brain does. This is an example of a possible way of fleshing out
mind-to-matter anomalism. However, this view turns out to be inconsistent
with simple empirical observations (see Bourget 2004).
In order for the “quantum response” to the problem of mental causation
for dualism to be plausible, it has to respect the constraint that quantum
measurements have very slight effects on macroscopic systems as far as we
can observe. To my knowledge, no theory that clearly respects this constraint
has been offered. However, it remains that mind-to-matter anomalism seems
to be the dualist’s best possible solution to the problem of mental causation.
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3 The mapping problem
The previous section motivated mind-to-matter anomalism. In this section,
I present a motivation for matter-to-mind anomalism. While some authors
have considered mind-to-matter anomalism, I don’t think that anyone has
considered combining dualism with matter-to-mind anomalism. It seems to
be almost universally assumed that if the mind is not physical, it arises via
deterministic psychophysical laws. In this section, I want to point out that
it is not obvious that this assumption is correct.
If dualism and matter-to-mind nomism were both true, the psychophys-
ical laws that govern matter-to-mind causation would be fundamental laws
of nature. As Chalmers (1996) points out, such a view would only be plau-
sible if the psychophysical laws could be given a simple, general formulation
(roughly, one that fits on a t-shirt). Otherwise, the relevant psychophysical
laws would not be plausible candidate fundamental laws of nature. A canon-
ical statement of the psychophysical laws should also explicitly relate mental
states and physical states under their mental and physical descriptions, re-
spectively. For example, it would not do to say simply that “a physical state
gives rise to the mental state associated with it”. A suitable statement of a
psychophysical law would have to relate full descriptions of mental states as
such with physical states under their full physical descriptions. Call a general,
simple statement specifying which mental states (under a mental description)
occur in any given physical condition (under a physical description) a general
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psychophysical mapping. Matter-to-mind nomic dualism seems to require the
existence of a general psychophysical mapping, in the sense that the former
would be quite implausible if we knew that there is no such mapping to be
found.
I want to suggest that we have fairly good evidence that there is no gen-
eral psychophysical mapping. Note first that the existence of psychophysical
correlations does not imply the existence of a general psychophysical map-
ping. It could be that there is a perfect correlation between phenomenal
properties and physical properties, in the sense that the same phenomenal
property is always instantiated along with the same physical property and
vice versa, yet there is no general psychophysical mapping. Perfect correla-
tion is even consistent with the absence of a finitely statable psychophysical
mapping (a minimally demanding understanding of the requirement that a
general psychophysical mapping be “simple”).
Neuroscience has revealed numerous correlations between brain areas and
types of conscious experience and other kinds of mental activity. It has also
revealed what appear to be limited mappings between aspects of conscious
experience and certain kinds of brain activity. For example, the phenomeno-
logical color space can plausibly be mapped in a relatively straightforward
way to dimensions of activation in certain neural networks in the brain (see
Churchland 1986). These are impressive findings, but they fall far short of
a general psychophysical mapping. The associations that we know exist be-
tween phenomenal properties and physical properties don’t seem to fall under
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a broad pattern that suggests a general psychophysical mapping. If we were
to plot the known correlations between physical and phenomenal properties,
we would see some local patterns (as in the case of color experience), but,
aside from these local patterns, the points would jump all over the place,
forming no recognizable curve that we can characterize. We have no idea
how to extrapolate a general psychophysical mapping from what we have.
Such a mapping has not even been imagined.8
I don’t wish to diminish the accomplishments of neuroscience in any way:
an extremely impressive number of correlations have been found. On the
contrary, my point is that the vast quantity of correlational data that has
been collected, together with the absence of a candidate general psychophys-
ical mapping, makes it plausible that no psychophysical mapping is to be
found. The more we find out about psychophysical correlations, the more
non-generalizable they seem.
One philosophical theory initially seems to help with the mapping prob-
lem: representationalism. Representationalism is roughly the view that an
experience of a quality Q is a mental state that phenomenally represents Q.9
If we could give an account of the physical basis of phenomenal representa-
tion, then it seems that we would have a general psychophysical mapping.
8Chalmers’ (1996) information-theoretic proposal might be closest that we have come.
9For defenses of non-reductive representationalism, see Byrne (2001), Crane (2003),
Chalmers (2004), Pautz (2009), Bourget and Mendelovici (2014), and Bourget (forthcom-
ing b). Some representationalists suggest that a further ingredient might be required in
addition to phenomenal representation of a content: an intentional mode or representa-
tional manner (see Crane 2003, Chalmers 2004, Speaks 2010, 2015). I argue against such
extra ingredients in Bourget (2015, 2017, forthcoming a).
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Suppose that physical relation R is the physical basis of phenomenal repre-
sentation. Then it seems that we have the following general psychophysical
mapping:
Representationalist mapping An individual experiences quality Q just
in case they stand in R to Q.
Suppose, for example, that R is the relation that one stands in to X just
in case one has an internal state that is cognitively integrated and “tracks”
the presence of X in the world. Call representationalism combined with this
account of R non-reductive tracking representationalism, or NRT represen-
tationalism. Given NRT representationalism, it seems that we can predict
what sort of experience one has in any given condition. For example, if one
stands in R to redness, then one will experience redness.
Despite appearances, NRT representationalism does not provide a general
psychophysical mapping, even if R can be specified in a plausible way. A
general psychophysical mapping is supposed to relate phenomenal properties
under a phenomenal description with physical properties under a physical
description. NRT representationalism does not specify such a mapping. The
problem is that “experiencing Q” and “tracking Q” cannot at the same time
be phenomenal and physical descriptions of phenomenal states and physical
states, respectively, because “Q” is couched either in phenomenal language
or in physical language.
To make the problem more vivid, consider how NRT representationalism
might try to predict which mental state is associated with any given physical
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state. The idea is that we check which property is tracked. If an individual is
tracking Q in the right way, we can predict that the individual is experiencing
Q. The problem with this is that, when we identify what is tracked, we iden-
tify it under a physical description, for example, “the property of reflecting
electromagnetic radiation of about 650 nm” (R650, for short). “Experiencing
R650” is not a phenomenal description of the state of experiencing red—the
proper phenomenal description of that state is “experiencing red”. So the
NRT representationalist account does not make any prediction about expe-
riencing red under a phenomenal description. This fact is easily overlooked
because we know, independently of NRT representationalism, that the ex-
periences we have when looking at objects that have R650 are experiences
of red, but this is knowledge we have above and beyond what NRT repre-
sentationalism tells us. By itself, NRT representationalism does not give the
phenomenal description of the state associated with tracking R650.
A parallel problem arises if we try to generate predictions in the mind-
to-matter direction. If NRT representationalism is true, then experiencing
red is associated with tracking redness. But “tracking redness” is not a phys-
ical description if “redness” is understood in a way that speaks to the phe-
nomenology (if it means what it means as part of the phenomenal description
“experiencing redness”). Without being given a physicalist theory of redness,
which cannot be inferred from NRT representationalism, we don’t know what
is the correct physical description of redness or tracking redness.
The problem can be put slightly differently as follows. A solution to the
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mapping problem needs to specify a function that generates predictions such
as this for all physically possible conditions that result in some conscious
experience:
X experiences redness iff X stands in R to R650
Since phenomenal and physical descriptions are distinct, the representation-
alist schema does not have the right form to specify such a function. The
following is the right form, where f is a function that maps physical de-
scriptions of physical properties to phenomenal descriptions of experienced
qualities:
An individual experiences f(Q) just in case they stand in R to Q.
Alternatively, the positions of “Q” and “f(Q)” could be swapped and the in-
verse of f used. Only a theory that fits this schema could possibly relate
phenomenal descriptions with (distinct) physical descriptions, but I am not
aware of any proposed non-trivial specification of f. So far, NRT representa-
tionalists have effectively assumed that it is the identity function.
There are other relational views of experience that might seem to specify
a general psychophysical mapping of the form of the representationalist map-
ping, for example, naïve realism. The very form of that mapping guarantees
that these theories do not supply a general psychophysical mapping.
It turns out, then, that NRT representationalism and other relational
theories of consciousness do not specify a general psychophysical mapping.
This is why I said earlier that a general psychophysical mapping has not even
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been imagined. What we have imagined is a theory that seems to specify a
general psychophysical mapping.
Once the apparent solution to the mapping problem offered by NRT rep-
resentationalism and similar views is set aside, the problem seems completely
hopeless for matter-to-mind nomic dualism. There is simply no discernible
suitably general pattern in the known phenomenal-physical correlations re-
vealed by neuroscience or everyday observation, and there is little hope of
finding any.
This leaves the dualist with two choices regarding causation in the matter-
to-mind direction: acausalism and anomalism. Matter-to-mind acausalism
would require something like a pre-established harmony to keep mental states
and physical state in sync, which is extremely implausible (especially without
theism as a supporting hypothesis). It seems, then, that matter-to-mind
anomalism should be considered seriously.
4 Anomalous panpsychism
In section 2, we saw that, despite obvious difficulties, the most reasonable
approach to the problem of mental causation for the dualist is to reject
mind-to-matter nomism in favor of mind-to-matter anomalism. The map-
ping problem discussed in section 3 is a problem for dualism combined with
matter-to-mind nomism, and we have seen that matter-to-mind anomalism
may be the best way out of this problem for the dualist. Taken together, these
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considerations make a case for considering anomalous dualism, the kind of
dualism that endorses anomalism about both mind-to-matter and matter-to-
mind causation. As far as the considerations pertaining to mental causation
and the mapping problem are concerned, anomalous dualism seems to be the
most promising dualist view.
Even if anomalous dualism combines the best answers to the arguments
from completeness and the mapping problem, this does not mean that the
view is plausible. In particular, a number of objections need to be addressed.
I will consider the following objections:
First, even if anomalous dualism is technically speaking consistent with
mental efficacy, does it not give up on a truly significant causal role for con-
sciousness? As we noted in our discussion of quantum theories of mental
causation, quantum mechanics and the total body of evidence concerning
the dynamics of physical systems do not seem to leave much room for mind-
caused random effects to make much of a difference to the course of physical
events. For this reason, it seems that mind-to-matter anomalism is inconsis-
tent with macroscopic mind-to-matter causal connections, for example, with
the fact that my conscious intention to raise my arm seems to cause my arm
to raise. I will refer to the claim that there is macroscopic mind-to-matter
causation but hardly any observable macroscopic random events as causation
without randomness.
Second, anomalous dualism seems in tension with the existence of psy-
chophysical correlations. Even if neuroscience has not solved the mapping
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problem, it has uncovered numerous correlations between brain activity and
conscious activity: the same brain activity is always accompanied by the
same conscious activity. Call this fact the mind-brain correlation observa-
tion. It is not clear that anomalous dualism is consistent with the mind-brain
correlation observation.
Third, if mind and matter were only randomly associated, wouldn’t our
experience be a mere “blooming, buzzing confusion”? Instead, our conscious
minds seem to have some sort of internal cohesion. Call this fact phenomenal
cohesion.
Lastly, anomalous dualism might not have the problem of specifying a
general psychophysical mapping, but is this not simply because it gives up
on explaining consciousness altogether? How could anomalous dualism ex-
plain consciousness and shed light on its place in nature without giving us
psychophysical laws that explain how phenomenal states arise and what ef-
fects they have?
Despite appearances, anomalous dualism is at least in principle consistent
with causation without randomness, mind-brain correlations, and phenome-
nal cohesion. It is also easy to see how it can be genuinely explanatory. The
following picture can serve as a kind of proof of concept, though its details are
obviously implausible. Suppose that physical and phenomenal properties are
wholly distinct, but that every physical property is “linked” to a randomly
selected phenomenal property (within certain constraints) the first time it
occurs in the history of universe. As an example, suppose that the following
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two constraints apply to this random linking: i) if physical properties P and Q
are both instantiated at the time of the linking, they are linked to consistent
phenomenal properties (assuming representationalism, we can say that two
phenomenal properties are consistent when their contents are consistent); ii)
if physical property P necessitates physical property Q, then P’s phenomenal
property necessitates Q’s. Once linked, phenomenal and physical properties
forever co-occur across the universe. Suppose also that the phenomenal prop-
erties of a physical system can in some circumstances have a random effect
on the dynamics of the system. Say, for example, that any physical system
about to enter a total physical state involving physical properties associated
with inconsistent phenomenal properties randomly jumps to another physi-
cal state with a probability determined by the physical state of the system.
(Such an event could be modeled as a measurement by quantum mechanics,
but it doesn’t have to be something that we would intuitively describe as a
measurement and, conversely, events that we describe as measurements don’t
have to occur in this way). These suppositions together specify a view I am
going to refer to as the random theory. This view is a kind of nonreductive
anomalous panpsychism: it combines dualism (nonreductionism) with gen-
eralized anomalism and panpsychism, the view that phenomenal properties
pervade the physical universe. I am going to refer to this kind of view more
simply as anomalous panpsychism.
The random theory is quite implausible on its face, and seriously vague
and underspecified, but it is useful to consider as a first step into the largely
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unexplored conceptual space of anomalous dualism and anomalous panpsy-
chism. I want to suggest that its principles could potentially be precisified in
a way that might yield an explanation of consciousness consistent with the
mind-brain correlation observation, phenomenal cohesion, causation without
randomness, completeness, and the overall body of evidence regarding the
dynamics of physical systems.
The mind-brain correlation observation is the easiest case: it only requires
that the same phenomenal and physical properties tend to occur together.
The random theory is not only consistent with this fact, but its linking
principle offers an explanation for it (however intrinsically implausible it
might seem as stated).
Phenomenal cohesion requires us to think about what would have hap-
pened over time if the random theory were true. Let us assume that there is
some principled way of delineating the physical systems to which the random
theory refers that counts properly functioning animal brains, or at least big
parts of animal brains, as whole systems.10 Under this assumption, we would
expect the brains of organisms to have evolved so that they barely ever enter
physical states that have been linked to inconsistent phenomenal properties
10Someone attracted to something like the random theory might speculate that quan-
tum entanglement is what delineates systems. A number of authors have explored
entanglement-based explanations of the fact that consciousness seems to unify contri-
butions from different parts of a physical system (e.g. Lockwood 1989, Penrose 1994,
Seager 1995). There is a widespread misconception (among philosophers) that “decoher-
ence” virtually eliminates entanglement from the macroscopic world, but in fact the theory
only predicts that decoherence makes entanglement unnoticeable by making the results of
quantum measurement statistically like those of classical measurements. See Schlosshauer
2005 for a relatively non-technical explanation of decoherence.
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(or at least not macroscopic states linked to inconsistent properties). Unless
they had so evolved, they would be suffering from the disruptive effects of
random jumps, which would make them unstable, hence not prone to survive.
Regarding simpler physical systems (including, in the limit case, isolated par-
ticles), their having fewer phenomenal properties (in virtue of having fewer
physical properties) might explain their stability: they are not very likely to
enter inconsistent states. The final result, then, should be brains and other
macroscopic physical systems in which the potential random effects due to
consciousness are largely absent, which is what we find. We should also ex-
pect the resulting stream of experiences supported by human brains to be
generally coherent, which is what we find (phenomenal cohesion).
In addition to predicting a certain orderliness that is consistent with what
we find, the random theory also predicts that phenomenal-physical associa-
tions should appear essentially random except for any structure implied by
the linking principle. Again, this is roughly consistent with what we find.
This is particularly interesting because no other theory even begins to ex-
plain the apparent randomness of mind-body correlations. Our half-baked
anomalous panpsychism seems to provide not only a proof of concept for an
explanation of the ways in which consciousness is organized, but it seems that
a story along these lines could also potentially explain the ways in which it
is disorganized. This might answer the charge that anomalous dualism gives
up on explanation.
We have yet to show that anomalous dualism, anomalous panpsychism, or
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the random theory is consistent with causation without randomness, which
one might say is the main problem with these views.
There is one important way in which the random theory illustrates the
possibility of macroscopic effects consistent with completeness and a general
lack of macroscopic quantum effects. If this theory is true, consciousness
might have played a role in structuring physical systems in the past, progres-
sively weeding out complex systems whose tendency to generate inconsistent
experiences makes them unstable. This requires that there were many macro-
scopic random events triggered by consciousness in the past, but not that
such events be common today. In this way, the random theory illustrates the
possibility that consciousness played an important causal role in the course
of evolution without making a detectable difference today.
This addresses the need for some efficacy throughout natural evolution,
but this does not fully address the objection that consciousness has macro-
scopic effects that are not simply random effects. In particular, this does
not accommodate alleged causal connections such as a mental state causing
a bodily movement.
The first thing to note here is that it is almost certain that no mental
state is nomologically sufficient for a bodily movement. The most that we
can ask for is causal relevance, not strictly speaking causation.
Without giving an analysis of causal relevance, it is plausible that events
that stand in counterfactual dependence relationships are in some sense
causally relevant to each other. For example, had there not been a spark, the
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fire would not have started. This seems to make the presence of the spark
causally relevant to the fire.
A view along the lines of the random theory could potentially deliver
just this kind of causal relevance between mental events and bodily move-
ments in a manner that is entirely consistent with completeness and the gen-
eral absence of macroscopic random events. To illustrate, take the following
counterfactual claim:
Chocolate Had you not consciously thought that there was a chocolate bar
in front of you, you would not have reached out in the way you did at
the time you did.
If Chocolate were true, your conscious thought that there was a chocolate
bar in front of you would be causally relevant to your reaching in the way
you did, just like the spark is causally relevant to the fire. The random
theory can potentially be precisified in such a way as to be consistent with,
and explain, facts such as Chocolate consistently with all evidence on hand.
Suppose, for example, that your perceptual systems were rigged in such a
way that, given their input at t (a retinal image of a chocolate bar), they
will trigger a conscious thought to the effect that there is a chocolate bar in
front of you at a specific location L if you are not having such a thought at t.
At the same time, suppose that your cognitive system was poised to theorize
about what is in front of you in such a way that if you don’t consciously
think that there is a chocolate bar in front of you at t, you will quickly form
a conscious thought to the effect that there is a certain non-chocolate desert,
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say, lemon pie, in front of you at L. In sum, your brain is in such a state that,
as a matter of nomologically necessity, if you are not having a thought that
there is a chocolate bar at L at t, it will, at t+1, produce both a conscious
thought that there is a chocolate bar at L and a conscious thought that
there is lemon pie at L. Given that these thoughts have inconsistent contents,
this setup makes the following counterfactual true: had you not consciously
thought that there was a chocolate bar in front of you, you would have
formed inconsistent conscious thoughts. On the random theory, inconsistent
phenomenal states trigger random disruptions. In principle, we could flesh
out the details of the case and the random theory in such a way that this
would have prevented you from reaching at just the time you did. This would
make Chocolate true. Of course, this example is highly contrived (I am only
trying to make a point of principle), but, for all we know, it could be that
the brain’s massively redundant architecture ensures that many phenomenal
states cannot be altered without generating an inconsistency, which would
underpin a kind of causal relevance for these states on the random theory.
This kind of causal relevance could be pervasive consistently with com-
pleteness and a general absence of detectable macroscopic random events.
This is because counterfactuals make no observable difference. For exam-
ple, the truth of Chocolate makes no observable difference to the course of
physical events. If the physical universe and the organisms it contains had
evolved to keep consciousness-caused random events to a minimum as the
random theory seems to predict, we would expect numerous counterfactuals
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like Chocolate to be true, which would give consciousness widespread causal
relevance that makes no detectable difference today.
While anomalous dualism is consistent with two important causal roles
for mental events, there are also causal roles that it is not consistent with: it
does not allow mental events to be nomologically necessary nor sufficient for
physical events, and, intuitively, it does not allow causal oomph to pass from
mental events to physical events in a deterministic way. One might say that
these are important shortcomings of the view. They are perhaps shortcom-
ings, but anomalous dualism at least succeeds in accommodating the core
evidence regarding mental causation. We don’t have very strong reasons to
think that causal oomph passes between mental and physical events, much
less to think that the two kinds of event are subsumed under nomological
principles. Such claims are simply not apparent to ordinary or scientific ob-
servation. The key reason mental causation must be accommodated is not
that it is directly observable, but that it seems necessary in order to make
sense of the place of consciousness in the mind and nature, in particular, of
the fact that brains seem to have evolved to make use of conscious states in
some way (as noted in section 2). Anomalous dualism promises to satisfy on
this score.
Our exploration of the random theory suggests that a view along these
lines can in principle explain the apparent arbitrariness of phenomenal-physical
associations while being consistent with macroscopic mental efficacy, an evo-
lutionary role for consciousness, the existence of numerous mind-brain cor-
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relations, phenomenal cohesion, the completeness of physics, and a general
lack of observed macroscopic randomness. As a kind of dualism, the ran-
dom theory is also consistent with arguments against all types of physicalism
(including those of Chalmers 1996 and Goff 2009). This makes anomalous
panpsychism the only position on the mind-body problem that is not cur-
rently open to principled objections (that I know of). Of course, the random
theory is implausibly vague and almost certainly not entirely correct. It is an
open empirical question whether or not a more precise anomalous panpsy-
chic theory can be specified that retains the theoretical virtues of the random
theory and is consistent with everything we know or may find out in physics
and neuroscience. My goal in this paper was only to try to open some new
conceptual space. Even though the random theory itself is implausible, its
many virtues suggest that the overall approach of anomalous panpsychism
might deserve more investigation.
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